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CORPORATE SOCIAL PERFORMANCE AND ECONOMIC CYCLES
ABSTRACT
Do firms respond to changes in economic growth by altering their corporate social
responsibility programs? If they do respond, are their responses simply neglect of areas
associated with corporate social performance (CSP) or do they also cut back on positive
programs such as profit sharing, public/private housing programs, or charitable contributions? In
this paper we argue that because CSP-related actions and programs tend to be discretionary, they
are likely to receive less attention during tough economic times, a result of cost-cutting efforts.
However, the various CSP performance areas vary in terms of their resource requirements and
their influence on financial performance (short- and long-term), which suggests that firms may
respond differently depending on area. Consequently, in addition to examining CSP concerns
separately from positive actions and programs (CSP strengths), we also examine the influence of
economic growth across the five areas of diversity, employee relations, the environment, product
quality/safety, and the community.
Based on data from 837 firms over fifteen years, our results suggest that firms neglect
some areas associated with CSP during economic downturns, resulting in increased concerns
about community and employee relations, product safety/quality, and the environment. However,
this relationship does not apply to positive actions and programs. Instead, firms tend to increase
their positive CSP programs in areas such as diversity, employee relations, and the environment
during periods of slow economic growth and reduce them when the economy picks up. We offer
potential explanations for our findings and discuss their importance to research on CSP.
Key Words: Corporate Social Responsibility, Corporate Social Performance, Measurement of
Social Performance, Economic Cycles, Recession
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INTRODUCTION
Corporate social responsibility has become a part of the fabric of Western society (Bondy,
et al, 2012). Society expects organizations to perform responsibly in the social, environmental,
and economic arenas (Elkington, 1997; Garriga and Melé, 2004; Norman and MacDonald,
2004), and organizations have responded through a variety of plans, programs, communications,
and other activities with the intended purpose of either purposefully aligning the interests of
society with the interests of the firm, or at least providing this impression (Du and Vieira, 2012;
Hsu, 2012; McShane and Cunningham, 2012; Uecker-Mercado and Walker, 2012). In some of
the most controversial industry sectors, this may involve simply minimizing harm (Lindorff, et
al, 2012).
Although there is disagreement regarding the precise definition of what constitutes
corporate social responsibility, its normative foundation is strong, based on moral concepts such
as responsibility, harm, intention and consequences (Eabrasu, 2012). It is possible to argue that
there is a contradiction between the pursuit of social goals and the pursuit of profit. Sabadoz
(2011) refers to this logical conflict as a “necessary contradiction.” However, many scholars have
argued that there is no contradiction, and that both objectives may be simultaneously pursued,
because of the economically advantageous benefits that socially responsible firms enjoy (i.e.,
Barringer and Harrison, 2000; Du, Bhattacharya and Sen; Russo and Fouts, 1997; Porter and
Kramer, 1997; Shane and Spicer, 1983).
Because resources expended in socially responsible ways potentially have less direct or
less obvious financial benefits (e.g., spending on “social causes”), the relationship between social
responsibility and profits has attracted significant research attention (i.e., Barnett and Salomon,
2006; Berman, et al, 1999; Choi and Wang, 2009; Hillman and Keim, 2001; Margolis and Walsh,
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2003; Orlitzky, et al, 2003; Surroca, et al, 2010). Some studies have supported a positive
relationship between corporate social performance (CSP) and firm performance, while others
have not; however, a meta-analysis documented a small positive relationship overall (Orlitzky, et
al, 2003). The converse question, that profitability may lead to improved social performance, has
also been studied and confirmed (e,g., Surroca, et al, 2010; Waddock and Graves, 1997).
While many researchers have studied the relationship between CSP and firm profitability
none, to our knowledge, has studied the link between economic growth and CSP. Based on a
review of the corporate social responsibility literature, Campbell (2007, p. 952) proposes:
“Corporations will be less likely to act in socially responsible ways when they are experiencing
relatively weak financial performance and when they are operating in a relatively unhealthy
economic environment where the possibility for near-term profitability is limited.” As noted, the
first part of this proposition has been confirmed in the empirical research literature. The second
part, dealing with relative economic conditions, has not.
In this study, we provide evidence regarding the influence of economic growth on CSP. In
addition to measuring CSP as an aggregate of all of the various components of corporate social
responsibility, we also examine each component separately, based on the assumption that
economic growth may have a different effect on, for example, environmental performance as
compared to employee performance. We also examine a firm’s CSP strengths and weaknesses
independently because strengths are more closely associated with positive actions that may be
resource intensive (i.e., charitable contributions, employee benefits) whereas concerns are more
likely to be associated with neglect of particular areas (i.e., environmental infractions, tax
violations) or cutting back on expenditures (i.e., layoffs). Consequently, economic growth could
influence these two aspects of CSP differently.
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Our findings offer strong evidence that economic conditions influence CSP and, as
expected, they influence some areas of CSP differently than other areas. The differences are
important to the literature because they help us understand how firms and their managers value
various factors associated with CSP. In supplemental analyses we also find that positive CSP
actions and programs (strengths) influence firm profitability differently than neglect of particular
areas associated with CSP (concerns). Our evidence provides a strong argument that economic
growth should be measured and included in future studies of CSP.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: First, we examine firm motivations for
pursuing socially responsible behavior, as well as countervailing influences. We then discuss
how changes in economic growth might be expected to influence CSP, as a whole and by type of
CSP. Following a description of our methods and presentation of results, we discuss the
implications of our findings for research and practice.

THE STABILITY OF INVESTMENTS IN SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
Although we did not find extant studies related directly to the relationship between
economic growth and CSP, evidence from existing research suggests such a relationship. Some
of this evidence regards the conjecture that higher slack resources (i.e., more liquidity), which
are often associated with profitability, allow for higher levels of activities associated with social
responsibility. This idea is supported by Harrison and Coombs (2012) in the context of
community investments and is also broadly supported in the Orlitzky et al (2003) meta-analysis
of the relationship between corporate financial performance and corporate social responsibility.
To complete the picture, there is evidence that slack is related to economic cycles (Sadowski,
2011). So economic health influences slack, and slack influences CSP. Note also that this logic
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suggests that it will be important to control for slack in any test of the relationship between
economic growth and CSP.
Corporations reacted to economic uncertainty caused by the most recent recession by
reducing investments in many areas. As of September 2010, total liquid assets rose as a share of
total corporate assets by approximately 2% since the start of the recession (Sadowski, 2011).
This ratio increased to as high as 7.4% at times, which was the highest relative cash percentage
for U.S. corporations since the middle of the 1950s (Sadowski, 2011). Anecdotal evidence
suggested reductions in investments in everything from information technology to research and
development as the economy weakened (Virki, 2012). Does a slowdown in these types of
investments also extend to social and environmental activities? In the language of Harwood, et al
(2011), how “resilient” is investment in corporate social responsibility?

Corporate Social Responsibility as a Crucial Investment Area Resistant to Changes in
Economic Growth
There are reasons to believe that CSP may not decline significantly during an economic
downturn. As mentioned previously, past empirical findings suggest a small positive relationship
between CSP and financial performance, which is supported by a rather large conceptual
literature. In this section we will focus on some of the core ideas in this literature to demonstrate
that firms may be reluctant to reduce investments in CSP-related areas even during economic
downturns.
Many of the early arguments supporting responsible corporate behavior were based on
avoidance of negative responses due to a lack of responsibility. For example, Spicer (1978)
suggested that socially responsible companies are less likely to be subject to expenses related to
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adverse legislation, regulatory penalties, or consumer retaliation. Consequently, the stocks of
socially responsible companies are less risky and therefore more attractive to investors (Cornell
& Shapiro, 1987; Shane & Spicer, 1983). This reasoning also supports a direct effect between
social responsibility and profitability because socially responsible firms, on average, should
spend less on the expenses associated with bad citizenship. Investment funds may provide
another benefit specifically related to demand for particular shares of stock, which can influence
their prices and thus shareholder wealth (Waddock and Graves, 1997). Many billions of dollars
have been channeled into funds that invest solely in companies that satisfy particular criteria of
social responsiveness (Pava and Krausz, 1996).
In addition, firms that are considered to be good citizens should be more attractive as
business partners or associates, thus leading to competitive advantage. For example, customers
may be more likely to shop at a store that is known as a “good corporate citizen” (Brown and
Dacin, 1997; Sen and Bhattacharya, 2001). Or highly skilled workers may be attracted to firms
that rank high on a list of the best employers (Moskowitz, 1972; Turban and Greening, 1996).
Similarly, responsible corporate behavior can facilitate the formation of long-term contracts,
alliances and joint ventures (Barringer and Harrison, 2000; Harrison and St. John, 1996). In
addition, stakeholders are more likely to trust a socially responsible firm compared to firms that
exhibit irresponsible behavior, and trust can lead to a reduction in transactions costs (Williamson,
1975) by reducing the amount of resources needed for creation and enforcement of contracts
containing elaborate safeguards and contingencies.
Some of the more recent arguments in favor of corporate social responsibility are based
on the notion of reciprocity, that a firm’s stakeholders respond favorably to virtuous firm
behavior in economically meaningful ways (Becker, 1986; Bosse, et al, 2009; Fassin, 2012;
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Simon, 1966). For example, stakeholders may be motivated to exhibit a high level of
performance when engaging with a firm that has exhibited fairness and integrity in its dealings.
They should also be more likely to share value-creating information with such a firm (Harrison,
et al, 2010). A recent study provides some evidence for this position. It demonstrates that
employee productivity is related not only to the integrity a firm manifests in its treatment of
employees, but also its customers (Cording, et al, 2014).
Society scrutinizes businesses based on widely held beliefs about what comprises socially
responsible behavior (Brummer, 1991). Consequently, tough economic times may represent the
ideal time to make targeted investments that help a firm differentiate itself from competitors,
especially for firms that have targeted CSP as a central part of their strategies. Discriminating
consumers reward firms that support causes in which these consumers believe (Vogel, 2005),
which may allow firms to retain, or grow, market share in periods of recession. Executives may
also recognize that CSP considerations are vital to the future of the business and should be cut
with great caution. Indeed, contrary to the argument they lay out above, Ellis and Bastin (2011,
p. 303) find that “the way the media has [sic] reported on CSR [corporate social responsibility]
has changed during the life cycle of the recession; moving away from the death of CSR to CSR
being a mechanism by which companies can survive and come out ‘the other side.’” Moreover,
they speculate “the recession has, across the board, had little real impact on CSR activities.”

Corporate Social Responsibility as a Discretionary Expense Highly Subject to Changes in
Economic Growth
As the economy slows, business investment weakens (Forrester, 1976). Investments in
CSP may be no different in this regard, where such activities may be seen as a discretionary
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expense that is only reasonable during prosperous times. At the core of the argument against
investments in CSP is the idea that attempts to be a good corporate citizen are more costly than
the benefits derived from such actions (Aupperle, et al, 1985). Adding to this perception is the
fact that benefits are often difficult to measure directly. Magnifying this position is the strong
tradition, correct or incorrect, that the primary responsibility of managers is to produce high
financial returns, and therefore investments that are less certain to provide such returns should be
avoided (Friedman, 1970; Rappaport, 1986; Wallace, 2003). Based on this logic, investments that
are not measurably related to a firm’s financial performance should be avoided and should
certainly be reduced or eliminated during tough times.
Related to these arguments, timing may actually be the critical deterrent to investments in
corporate social responsibility. Most often these sorts of investments are discretionary and may
take a long time to produce tangible returns. For example, investments focused on the
community, product safety, or employee relations may result in benefits over the longer term
based on the reciprocal forces discussed in the previous section. However, the expenses are
incurred immediately, thus reinforcing the short-term perspective often associated with
shareholder wealth maximization (Stout, 2012).
The idea that corporate social responsibility is an expensive indulgence is amply
evidenced in the popular press. For example, Caulkin (2009, p.1) writes, “Non-government
organisations and a number of other CSR observers see signs of companies reverting to the
default position that, in today's conditions, anything other than business as business is a luxury
that they can't afford (emphasis added).” Doane (2005, p. 25) also suggests that investments in
corporate social responsibility might not “pay off in the two- to four-year time horizon that
public companies…often seem to require.” Echoing Caulkin, Doane asserts that “investments in
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things like the environment or social causes become a luxury and are often placed on the
sacrificial chopping block when the going gets rough.” Finally, Ellis & Bastin (2011, p. 295)
summarize this view: “In times of recession or economic downturn, it is necessary to question
whether CSR is seen by business as a desirable optional extra, which can be culled in favour of
profit maximization.” In acknowledging that this view exists among some managers, Freeman
(1984, p. 40) writes “that the phrase often heard from executives is ‘corporate social
responsibility is fine, if you can afford it.’"
Similarly, Halal (1987, p. 124) suggests “…business people, under the pressure of
adapting to a challenging new environment in a time of economic crisis, came to view social
responsibility as a luxury that was to be afforded after they had earned sufficient profits to
indulge in this type of philanthropy.” Halal describes the “pressure of adapting to a challenging
new environment” as being the root cause of viewing social responsibility as a luxury. In this
description, it is not necessarily an actual firm-level profit decline that results in a new attitude
about investments in social responsibility. Rather, it is economic uncertainty that causes the
attitude (and presumably behavior that is consistent with this attitude). The same forces that have
resulted in firms building up their liquid assets during the present downturn (Sadowski, 2011),
rather than investing them, are likely also to lead to a situation in which firms are unlikely to
make new investments in non-core areas that may not be closely linked to short-run profits.
To summarize, during recessions firms may be more likely to focus on “quick fixes” that
can lead to short-term positive financial outcomes rather than on corporate social responsibility
activities. One possible finding from our study, then, is that when the economy weakens, CSP
declines, or at least no longer grows (Juscius, 2010).
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DIFFERENTIAL INFLUENCES OF ECONOMIC STRENGTH ON CSP FACTORS
During an economic recession, CSP may decline either 1) because of the elimination of
positive programs or activities in which firms previously engaged or 2) because of concerns
resulting from efforts to cut back in areas that are socially sensitive, leading to negative
stakeholder reactions such as lawsuits, regulatory actions, or contract controversies. These two
different types of responses require separate treatment (Mattingly and Berman, 2006). The health
of the economy, up or down, is likely to have a different impact on positive programs than it
does on behavior that leads to social concerns. Consistent with a stakeholder perspective that
firms are accountable to multiple constituencies (Freeman, 1984), we will examine these
phenomena across multiple areas, including the community, the environment, products/services,
employees, and diversity. We will discuss CSP strengths and concerns in terms of their resource
requirements and their potential influence on financial performance in the short term. We are
choosing to discuss short-term financial implications because, consistent with the theory
presented in the last section, we believe that economic downturns are likely to put pressure on
managers to focus more on the short term.

Influences of the Economy on CSP Strengths
CSP strengths come from positive corporate programs or activities associated with
corporate social responsibility. For example, in the community area, strengths are associated
with activities such as generous corporate giving programs (domestic and international) and
support for community housing and educational programs. Investments in the community can
require a lot of resources (although they may be relatively easy to reduce if necessary), and they
tend to have an immediate negative impact on the financial condition of the firm. That is,
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philanthropy directly reduces the amount of financial resources available for the shareholders
and other stakeholders, and for other types of investments directly related to firm operations.
Any potential financial payoff is uncertain, and is likely to be realized over a period of years
rather than immediately. This is the type of investment we expect to see reduced during
economic downturns and increased in periods of economic prosperity.
Corporations can also increase their CSP through strengths in other areas. In the human
resources area, CSP strengths include factors such as employee profit sharing programs and
strong retirement benefits. For product quality and safety, CSP strengths include the
development of a noteworthy quality or R&D program, as well as production of new products
that benefit the economically disadvantaged. New programs to develop these sorts of product and
employee strengths seem fairly resource intensive both financially and in human terms, and
would tend to have a noticeable impact on a firm’s bottom line, although it is possible that the
payoffs could begin to accrue to the firm a little more quickly than in areas such as corporate
philanthropy that are less closely related to the value-creating core of the business.
Environmental strengths are also highly relevant to this discussion and often included in
studies of corporate social responsibility (i.e., Berman, et al, 1999; Choi and Wang, 2009;
Hillman and Keim, 2001; Kang, 2013; Waddock and Graves, 1997). Environmental strengths are
associated with programs such as pollution prevention, recycling, and use of alternative fuels.
These sorts of programs tend to use a lot of financial, human and even capital resources;
however, some of the expenses can be recouped through cost savings (Russo and Fouts, 1997).
Still, even in the best-case scenario that the benefit to cost ratio is positive, it will likely take a
while to be realized. Consequently, a period of economic recession may be an unlikely time to
begin an activity in this area.
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Finally, diversity strengths are another factor often included in studies of corporate
responsibility. Support of strong family benefit programs such as daycare can be very resource
intensive; however, most of the other factors would seem to have a more moderate impact on the
bottom line of the firm. For example, most of the diversity strengths focus on firm treatment of
protected groups or females, such as their participation in leadership as CEO or on the board of
directors, use of female- or minority-owned contractors, employment of the disabled, or
progressive gay/lesbian policies. Because the bulk of the diversity strengths are not as resource
intensive as some of the other strengths, they may not have as much of a negative immediate
influence on financial performance, and may therefore respond differently to economic cycles
than the other strengths.
Overall, because of the amount of resources required to start new programs in the CSP
strength areas, and the immediate effect of these resource allocations on financial performance,
we expect that firms are unlikely to engage in actions to build these strengths during economic
downturns, and are more likely to build programs in these areas in economic good times. Having
said this, we acknowledge that highly visible positive programs may be hard to eliminate without
serious consequences, especially with a vigilant press. In fact, the counter argument is that firms
might actually be interested in engaging in positive programs for the reason of attempting to
counteract the influences of a recession. Regardless, there is variance across both the resources
needed and the theorized time lags between resource allocations and potential financial payoffs,
as well as the uncertainty of those payoffs. Consequently, we need to test both the cumulative
CSP strengths and the individual strengths to gain a complete picture.

13

Corporate Social Performance and Economic Cycles, p. 14
Influences of the Economy on CSP Weaknesses
During a recession, CSP could also decline through neglect of areas associated with
corporate social responsibility. We define CSP concerns as problems stemming from violations
of societal expectations associated with corporate social responsibility. Again, we will examine
each of the CSP concern areas in terms of the resources involved and the potential for short-term
impact on financial performance.
Three of the CSP concern areas seem to have a lot in common in terms of the types of
corporate behaviors associated with them. Community concern areas include problems such as
tax disputes, investment controversies, and having a negative impact on the community. Product
concerns include marketing or contracting controversies, product safety problems, and antitrust
concerns. Employee concerns include difficulties with unions, health and safety concerns, and
concerns about pensions or benefits, as well as workforce reductions. These sorts of problems
seem to share a common objective in that they all seem to be closely associated with efforts to
reduce the resources allocated to these areas in an effort to cut costs and thus increase financial
performance in the short term. For example, tax disputes can occur as a result of trying to avoid
taxes, union difficulties can emerge as companies try to re-write union contracts during tough
times and, of course, workforce reductions are directly associated with cost-cutting efforts.
Because of their strong link to cost cutting, we expect that all of them will be more evident
during recessions and less evident when economic times are good.
The cost savings associated with environmental concerns seem to be less direct. For
example, in the environmental area, concerns include problems with substantial omissions or
hazardous waste. On the surface, we are unsure how increasing omissions or waste would be
expected to significantly reduce resource allocations and thus increase financial performance.
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Perhaps the most logical expectation is that firms may simply reduce resources expended for
monitoring and control activities in an effort to cut costs during recessions, and increase these
resources during economic upturns.
The influence of the economy on diversity concerns is also challenging to predict.
Diversity concerns focus primarily on employee discrimination in one form or another, and at
various levels of the organization (i.e., rank-and-file, top management). Discrimination, different
from affirmative action, would seem not to have much impact on resource allocations, except for
the legal costs associated with defending the firm. In today’s society, a firm that discriminates is
likely to experience negatives such as legal suits, reduced consumer demand, fewer opportunities
for alliances with other firms, and so forth, which can eventually hurt financial performance.
However, we do not believe the economy will have a significant impact on the level of
discrimination in the firm.
Given that three of the five CSP concern areas are so closely related to cost cutting, we
expect to find increased concerns during recessions and fewer concerns during economic
upturns. As before, the variance in possible cost savings and their possible influence on shortterm financial performance across the five areas serves as motivation to investigate the
relationships both cumulatively and separately.

METHODS
The KLD Measures
To assess our central question of the relationship between economic growth and CSP, we
examine the CSP of some of the largest, best-known companies in the United States economy.
We use the Kinder, Lydenberg, and Domini (KLD) ratings of firms' social and environmental
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performance because they are based on investments and other firm behaviors related to these
areas. Also, the KLD measures currently are the most widely used in empirical research on CSP
(i.e., Choi and Wang, 2009; Harrison and Coombs, 2012; Manner, 2010). Deckop, et al (2006, p.
334) recognized KLD as “the largest multi-dimensional CSP database available to the public.”
Waddock (2003, p. 369) refers to the KLD data as “the de facto [CSP] research standard.”
Beginning with Graves and Waddock (1994) and Brown and Perry (1994), researchers have been
drawn to the data because they provide a fairly consistent set of ratings on non-financial
performance. The data’s use is not restricted to academia, as KLD itself noted that 60% of the
world’s top institutional financial managers use KLD’s data and research to evaluate investments
(Chatterji, et al, 2009). The fact that KLD data is collected by a third party for a non-academic
purpose is a strength with regard to its use in academic research, because it eliminates the
potential bias that an academic researcher, because of familiarity with the topic, might
unintentionally code variables in a manner consistent with expected results.
We acknowledge from the outset that, like all data sources, the KLD data have
weaknesses (Chatterji, et al, 2009; Griffin and Mahon, 1997; Rowley and Berman, 2000).
However, it is not our intention in this paper to add to the discussion of the strengths and
weaknesses of the database as a proxy for CSP – let alone attempt to resolve these disputes. We
are using the KLD measures because 1) they are currently the most widely used proxy for
studying social and environmental performance in organizational research, so determining their
relationship with economic growth should be of broad interest in the field; and 2) the KLD
measures are based on real firm behaviors, which may include positive behaviors associated with
strengths or neglectful behaviors associated with concerns. After two acquisitions, the KLD data
are now owned by MSCI Inc. and called the ESG (environmental, social and governance)
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indices, but to avoid confusion we are keeping the traditional name most often found in the
research literature.
The KLD ratings are set up by categories – the natural environment, the community,
products, diversity, and employee relations – with a score for strengths and concerns for each
area. Examples include participation in programs that benefit the economically disadvantaged
(community strength), promotion of women and minorities (diversity strength), violations of
health and safety standards (employee concern), high emissions of toxic chemicals
(environmental concern), and marketing or contracting controversies (product concern). If the
rating in one of these areas changes it does so because of an observation by a KLD researcher for
the year in which it changes. Each strength or concern counts as 1 point for the area (either
positively or negatively). So, in essence, we are asking whether we are likely to see changes
(positive or negative) based on firm activities during the year in question in connection to
changes in economic growth, which is precisely the purpose of our study.
Because we are using KLD data, we are not in a position of having to determine which of
the concerns or strengths is more or less important. Each rating is based on firm behavior, and
managers make the decisions that influence the observed behavior. These same managers are
influenced by reports about the economy. In a downturn, we might see a firm execute a layoff.
This would result in adding a 1 to the concerns category in the employee area. In the same year,
the company could participate in a new public/private partnership for the economically
disadvantaged. This would result in adding one to community strengths.
KLD researchers use a proprietary research process to collect the data they use to make
their ratings (KLD Research and Analytics, 2008). However, we assume that much of the
information they use for their ratings is also publicly available. To confirm that such is the case,
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and to get a better sense for how KLD makes its ratings, we examined several instances where
KLD had changed a rating for a variable in one of the most commonly-used categories for 2008
and 2009. We did searches using publicly available information such as press releases, annual
reports, the popular business press, and trade magazines and found evidence supporting the
ratings change made by KLD. Table 1 illustrates what we found, with examples based on a
concern and strength for each of the five categories of employee relations, product issues,
diversity, community and the environment.
(Insert Table 1 about here)

Sample
Because we are examining broad trends we included as much data as possible while also
ensuring comparability from year to year. KLD reports summary measures of total strengths and
concerns for each of the five areas we include. However, since KLD began collecting data in
1991 some variables have been added and dropped within their broad categories, which means
that KLD’s summary measures are not directly comparable from year to year. To ensure
comparability and eliminate the possibility that any changes we observe are due simply to
including or excluding particular variables, we settled on a group of variables for each area that
was available for each of the years of our study. From 1995 to 2009 fifty variables were
consistently included for each company in the matrix for the five areas, which is an average of 10
ratings per area. In 2010 KLD made highly significant changes to the database, both adding and
dropping numerous variables. The changes obviously reflect changes in the demand patterns of
their core business customers (not academic researchers). Unfortunately, this means that the 2010
data are not comparable to 2009 or previous data. Our database, then, includes 50 variables in the
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five groups over the years 1995 to 2009. The number of firms included for each year varies,
which means that we have an unbalanced panel design. Our sample includes 837 firms for most
of the tests. We lost a small number of firms for our moderation tests because ROA was not
available in the subsequent year for some observations.

Measures
Dependent variable. Our dependent measures are all based on the KLD ratings. Based
on the corporate social responsibility literature, five KLD areas are attractive to researchers who
examine social issues. They are community relations, product safety/quality issues (reflecting
customer interests), employee relations, diversity issues and environmental protection (Berman,
et al, 1999; Choi and Wang, 2009; Hillman and Keim, 2001; Kang, 2013; Waddock and Graves,
1997). As suggested previously, economic cycles may influence CSP strengths differently from
CSP weaknesses. Consequently, our primary tests include models with two different dependent
variables. The first is the sum of CSP strengths (Total Strengths), and the second is the sum of
CSP concerns (Total Concerns). We standardized the totals for the five areas for increased
comparability (i.e., Mattingly and Berman, 2006). For consistency, we used the standardized
scores for each KLD area throughout our analyses, including the correlation matrix. We ran
models separately for each of the five CSP areas, consistent with the idea that firms may respond
differently in the various areas. In supplemental analysis we also ran models to investigate
whether economic cycles moderate the relationship between CSP and firm performance. These
supplemental tests and corresponding results are described in our discussion section.
Primary independent variable. Our primary independent measure is Change in Gross
Domestic Product (ΔGDP) Per Capita (Economic Report of the President, 2011) over one year.
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GDP is appropriate for our study because it is an indicator of potential changes in the demand for
the products and services of the firms in our sample, presumably influencing sales and thus the
amount of resources they have available to them to cover their obligations, as well as
discretionary investments (Narayan, 2008). Also, GDP is highly correlated with other measures
of economic health, such as unemployment, and is sometimes referred to as “the central measure
of an economy” (Hobijn and Steindel, 2009, p. 1). Perhaps most important is the widespread
acceptance of Shiskin’s (1974) suggestion that two consecutive quarterly declines in GDP are a
rule of thumb for identifying recessions (Gaski, 2012). The CSP variables (and controls) lag the
GDP variable by one year, allowing firms to adjust their CSP decision making on the basis of
what is happening in the economy or, alternatively, to experience the consequences from neglect
of certain areas associated with CSP.
Control variables. Our control variables are based on financial data from Compustat. As
explained in the theory section, managers might be expected to respond to an uncertain economy
by conserving cash instead of spending it on activities associated with the investment areas we
are examining or, indeed, any investments. For example, economic uncertainty could cause a
firm to hold on to cash rather than investing it in programs for employees or donating it to
community causes. We control for this influence by determining what portion of total assets is
held as cash (cash/assets). We further recognize that the economy can influence debt, as firms
may find it difficult to pay their obligations in a poor economy. We control for this influence by
comparing debt to a firm’s total capitalization (total debt/assets).
In addition, the economy may affect profitability and profitability may in turn influence
how much a firm is willing to invest in initiatives with indirect financial consequences. In preanalysis testing we found that ROA (net income/assets) varies more closely with the economy
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relative to other common profitability measures we could have included (ROE and ROS).
Therefore, we include ROA to control for firm profitability. Firm size might also be expected to
have an influence on how firms respond to economic conditions and due to higher social
visibility and the extent to which they have resources to invest in the sorts of initiatives measured
by KLD. Our measure of firm size is the log of firm sales. We also include research and
development intensity (R&D/sales) and advertising intensity (advertising/sales) because these
variables have been found to be important in explaining social performance (Brammer and
Millington, 2008; Brammer and Pavelin, 2006; McWilliams and Siegel, 2000).
We also created industry control variables. However, we discovered serious
multicollinearity issues between the industry variables and R&D Intensity that could not be
resolved with variable transformations. This is not surprising because the level of R&D spending
is strongly influenced by a firm’s industry. However, because we are using a panel design that
examines changes in variables longitudinally, we are not particularly concerned about dropping a
variable (in this case industry) that has no variation over time within particular firms. After
examination we discovered that it was uncommon for a firm in our sample to change its primary
industry during the period of study. On the other hand, R&D has been found to be a very
important and potentially even a confounding variable when examining CSP (e.g., McWilliams
and Siegel, 2000). Also, the observed multicollinearity between R&D and industry suggests that
R&D explains much of the variance associated with industry, so we are not losing much
explanatory power by dropping industry in favor of keeping R&D. To be cautious, we also
excluded the small number of firms (39) that changed their primary industries over the course of
our study. Table 2 contains descriptive statistics for our variables for the 837 companies in our
sample.
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(Insert Table 2 about here)

Statistical Tests
Because some of our sample companies are not represented for every year of the study,
we have an unbalanced panel design with a company identifier as a stratification variable and
year as a period variable. Our complete model is:
CSP = f (∆ GDP per capita, cash/assets, debt/assets, current ratio,
ROA, size, advertising intensity, R&D intensity)
We used a two-way random effects model for our statistical tests because we are
generalizing to a population not completely represented by our sample. Fixed-effects models
focus on the intra-sample variability and assume that any other unmeasured variables will not
impact the dependent variable. In contrast, random effects models assume that there are
unknowns that can impact the dependent variable, thus acknowledging that the sample was taken
from a larger population (Field, 2001; Snijders, 2005). The appropriateness of an effects model is
also confirmed by very high values for the Lagrange Multiplier (Greene, 2007), which are
reported in the tables containing our results. Sometimes the Hausman statistic is also computed
for comparison with the Lagrange Multiplier (Judge, et al, 1985) to determine whether a fixed or
random effects model is more appropriate. However, in our case the Hausman statistic could not
be computed because the differences between the covariance matrices for the two tests were not
positive definite (Greene, 2007). Instead of forcing the issue by computing a generalized inverse,
which results in an inappropriate test statistic, Greene (2007) suggests that in these cases the
difference between the two estimators is random, which argues in favor of a random effects
model.
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RESULTS
Table 3 includes the results of our statistical tests for Total Strengths and Total Concerns.
The coefficients are highly significant for both CSP variables. The large size of the coefficients
for the GDP variable is a function of small average values for this variable relative to the control
variables. Consequently, the size of the coefficients for GDP is not directly comparable to the
size of the coefficients for the control variables, although their signs and significance levels are
meaningful. A negative sign for Total Strengths indicates that firms are more likely to invest in
positive CSP programs when economic growth is weak and less likely to do so when the
economy is strong. This is a rather surprising finding, and we will examine it further in the
discussion section. A negative sign for Total Concerns means that in slow growing economies
firms are more likely to neglect areas associated with CSP, resulting in negative outcomes such
as pollution, tax violations, legal suits or other controversies. Neglect of CSP is not particularly
surprising when firms are dealing with an adverse economy.
(Insert Table 3 about here)
Table 4 provides meaningful detail regarding which CSP factors are driving the results
found in Table 3. As expected, firms respond differently to economic growth across the five CSP
areas. The Total Strengths variable is primarily a function of actions and programs associated
with diversity, the environment, and product safety/quality, although the latter area is less
significant than the other two. Since the individual CSP variables are standardized for each area,
the size of the individual coefficients compared to the size of the coefficients for other CSP
variables in otherwise similar models have some meaning. Consequently, based on the relatively
large size of the coefficient for diversity, these initiatives appear to be the most influential factor
in the Total Strengths variable. The Total Concerns variable is largely a function of community
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and employee relations, environmental problems, and product safety/quality issues. Diversity is
not significant for CSP concerns – there is no increase or decrease in diversity concerns as a
function of changes in GDP.
(Insert Table 4 about here)
Among the most interesting control variables, Size was significant in all of the models.
As we expected, larger firms tend to have both more strengths and more concerns, perhaps a
function of the diversity of their operations on the concerns side and the ability their resources
give them to pursue more positive projects (strengths). There is one negative coefficient, in the
diversity concerns model, which implies that larger firms have fewer diversity concerns. When
Cash/Total Assets is significant, its sign is positive, which is consistent with the idea that high
cash levels facilitate CSP. In addition, R&D intensity is also important in many of the models,
and is positive in every case. This is as expected – as firms increase in CSP they might also be
expected to increase their research budgets.
We ran some supplementary tests to examine both trends and the influence of economic
forces on our control variables independently of our CSP models. Consistent with observations
about the increase in liquid assets during the most recent recession, we found a positive and
significant (p<.01) relationship between change in GDP and current ratios. However, in spite of
the fact that we found that higher cash balances tend to be related to high CSP, we also found that
cash balances as a percentage of total assets have actually dropped, a possible indication that
inventories make up a significant portion of the liquid assets held by firms as a function of
economic cycles. As we expected, total debt levels are negatively associated with change in GDP
(p<.001). We also found a negative relationship for size (p<.001) and a positive relationship for
R&D intensity (p<.01). Advertising intensity was not significantly related to changes in GDP.
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While ROA had a stronger relationship with economic volatility in pre-tests than other common
measures of profitability, it nonetheless was not significant. This is particularly interesting in that
it provides evidence to support a lot of current anecdotal evidence that many large firms are
doing quite well in terms of profits during the current recession (obviously others are not, which
accounts for an insignificant finding).

DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS
The empirical models offer strong evidence that economic growth influences CSP.
Furthermore, there is significant evidence that firms respond differently to economic growth
depending on whether CSP involves positive actions and programs or areas that might be
neglected, thus causing concerns. In addition, we found evidence that economic growth
influences various areas of CSP differently – community, diversity, employee relations,
environmental protection, or product safety/quality. We will discuss each of these findings,
beginning with CSP concerns.
We observed a significant increase/decrease in CSP-related concerns when the economy
is weak/strong. This is evidence that firms may neglect some aspects of social responsibility as a
response to tough economic times (Halal, 1987) and restore their vigilance in these areas during
good times. In this sense, CSP is responding like other types of corporate resource allocations,
which tend to decline with recessions (Forrester, 1976). It is worth mentioning again that we do
not believe that it is necessarily an actual firm-level profit decline that results in an attitude and
decisions that result in CSP concerns. Instead, it is uncertainty about the future that results in a
new attitude, and presumably decision-making that is consistent with this attitude. During a
recession this new attitude might be called survival mode (Sadowski, 2011; Virki, 2012).
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To really understand this relationship it is helpful to look at some of the individual items
that make up the concerns tracked by KLD. Tax disputes are among the possible concerns in the
community relations area. It is logical that these types of problems will increase in a slow
economy as firms look for ways to cut their tax burdens. Violation of health and safety standards,
workforce reductions and underfunded pensions are all areas of concern in the employee
relations area. All of these seem to be logical areas for cutbacks during a recession. In the
environmental area, concerns include violating environmental regulations and production of
toxins. For product safety/quality, concerns include product safety infractions and marketing or
contracting controversies. Concerns in both of these areas can be explained by an attitude of
trying to save money. On the other hand, when times are perceived as good, firms are more likely
to try to fix problems in these areas.
The negative relationship between changes in GDP and CSP strengths is fascinating and
somewhat unexpected. We will attempt to provide a plausible explanation here, based on the
existing conceptual literature. The starting point is to accept that some of the vast literature on
the long-term competitive advantages of corporate social responsibility is legitimate. In the front
end, we mentioned some of these advantages, which include reduced risk (Cornell & Shapiro,
1987; Shane & Spicer, 1983); attractiveness to investors (Waddock and Graves, 1997); attraction
of high quality employees, customers and other stakeholders (Vogel, 2005; Turban and Greening,
1996; Barringer and Harrison, 2000); trust leading to a reduction in transactions costs
(Williamson, 1975); reciprocity by stakeholders leading to higher levels of value creation (Bosse,
et al, 2009); and higher quality information (Harrison, et al, 2010). In each case the authors relate
these factors to higher firm performance, which should provide incentives to corporations to
engage in responsible behavior.
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The second logical step in our explanation of the influence of growth in GDP on CSP
strengths is to understand that firms and their managers make investment decisions based on the
attractiveness of a particular investment at a particular time. During a recession investment
opportunities in traditional business areas may have less appeal than during a boom because of
uncertainty. For example, a recession is a less likely time to expand a business into new markets
or to build a new factory than during an economic boom. Uncertain future demand during a
recession means that the firm may see a positive investment in CSP as relatively more attractive
than during a boom because other investment opportunities appear relatively less attractive. This
may be especially true for firms that have a deliberate social responsibility strategy. On the other
hand, during periods of strong economic growth, a firm may be more likely to invest resources
into areas associated with expansion, which is the other side of the relationship.
From a strategic perspective, because society scrutinizes the social behavior of
corporations, positive investments in activities associated with CSP that enhance a corporate
reputation might be seen as a type of differentiation strategy (i.e., Fombrun, 2001; McWilliams
and Siegel, 2001; Turban and Greening, 1996). If so, then a recession may be perceived as an
ideal time to enhance a firm’s reputation for social responsibility, especially if managers believe
that other firms are likely to make cuts in these areas. Also, it is possible that positive CSP
actions and programs may help a firm come out of a recession in a stronger competitive position
(Ellis and Bastin, 2011).
With regard to the individual CSP strength areas, the environment, product safety/quality,
and diversity are the driving forces. Positive environmental protection programs may include
recycling programs, pollution prevention programs, or clean energy programs. Because of social
sensitivity to environmental protection, these sorts of programs tend to be broadly reported in
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annual reports, sustainability reports and the media. This reporting can do a lot to enhance a
firm’s social reputation. Furthermore, some “greening” projects lead to cost savings that can
cover much or all of the expenses, or even result in savings overall (Russo and Fouts, 1997).
Positive product factors include initiatives such as an exceptional quality assurance program,
leadership in R&D, or providing products or services to the economically advantaged. Again,
these are things that a firm can tout, and quality programs and R&D can also have economic
payoffs. Not surprisingly, positive community initiatives, mostly associated with charitable
giving, do not increase during economic downturns.
The influence of economic growth has a powerful effect on positive diversity programs
(strengths), although it does not influence diversity concerns (which means that concerns in this
area are immune to changes in economic growth). Diversity has received an increasing amount
of attention in society (Kochan, et al, 2003), so diversity initiatives are a good way to signal that
a firm is seeking to be socially responsible. Also, most of the ones tracked by KLD tend to be
relatively inexpensive when compared to positive initiatives in other CSP areas. For example,
although the diversity area includes family benefits, which can involve significant resources, it
also includes progressive gay/lesbian policies, appointing minority members to the board of
directors, employment of the disabled and contracting with women and minorities, all of which
tend to be relatively inexpensive compared to the other areas. It is possible that the value-to-cost
ratio for implementing these sorts of policies may be perceived as highly attractive for firms and
their managers providing, perhaps, at least a partial explanation for why firms are prone to
engage in diversity initiatives when economic growth is slow.
While not the primary purpose of this study, if economic growth influences CSP, it might
also moderate the relationship between CSP and firm performance. Of course, we recognize that
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we may not even find a significant relationship between CSP and firm performance, given that
this relationship has only been confirmed in about half of the empirical work on the topic
(Margolis and Walsh, 2002). In addition, we are including a control variable, R&D, found to
have a confounding influence on this relationship in previous work (McWilliams and Siegel,
2000). Nevertheless, a test for moderation effects has the potential to help explain why there is
inconsistency in previous findings.
For these tests the lagged relationships needed adjustment. We are testing whether CSP,
change in GDP, and the interaction between the two influence ROA. The GDP and control
variables should be for the same year as ROA because we are looking at these variables as
concurrent influences on firm performance. To clarify, a particular year’s profits should be
related to the same year’s economic growth, liquidity, size, and so forth. However, these
variables need to lag the CSP variables to provide time for CSP activities to influence profits.
This means that an extra year of financials was needed for each observation. The extra year’s
financial information was not available for 17 companies, resulting in a sample with 820
companies. The model results are found in Table 5.
(Insert Table 5 about here)
The results are quite interesting, but not particularly supportive of a strong moderation
effect. The CSP variable is negative and significant for the Total Strengths model, with or
without Change in GDP or the interaction term (CSP Strengths X Change in GDP). This is an
indication that positive CSP initiatives (CSP Strengths) started in one year are likely to have a
negative effect on profits in the next year. The logical explanation for this phenomenon is that
they cost money, which reduces profits. Also, CSP programs may have longer-term positive
financial benefits, but most of them probably don’t have immediate financial returns (Doane,

29

Corporate Social Performance and Economic Cycles, p. 30
2005).
Looking at the moderation effects, the only significant interaction effect is in the Total
Concerns model. Although it is disappointing to note that the primary variables (CSP Total
Concerns and Change in GDP) in this model are not significant, we nonetheless ran two more
models to determine what the significant interaction variable means. The observations used in
the original moderation test for Total Concerns were split based on the median value for Change
in GDP, thus creating a sample for high changes in GDP and another sample for low changes in
GDP (we also tried splitting at the mean, but this resulted in a highly uneven distribution of
companies). We then ran two models with ROA as the dependent variable, Total Concerns as the
primary independent variable, and the same control variables. The first model was for a high
growth economy. In this model Total Concerns was negative and significant, which means that in
a high growth economy less CSP Concerns are associated with higher profits. This logical effect
might be expected in any economy; however, in the second model for the low growth economy
CSP concerns is not a significant predictor of ROA.
Overall, this study yields some fairly important implications for future research on
corporate social responsibility in general and specifically for studies that make use of the KLD
measures. First, the change in GDP variable was a fairly consistent predictor of both CSP
Strengths and CSP Concerns, and across the five CSP activity areas. Consequently, one
implication is that researchers should use this easily accessible variable as a control in future
empirical work.
Second, CSP Strengths and CSP Concerns performed in opposite directions overall, as
well as in most of the five CSP activity areas. Most of the corporate social responsibility research
combines CSP Strengths and CSP Concerns for an overall measure of CSP. In this sort of
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measure we might expect strengths and concerns to offset each other, making interpretation of
results difficult or even incorrect. Given the popularity of combined measures in the CSP
literature, the offsetting influences problem could help explain some of the contradictory findings
in previous research.
Third, we found that results also varied depending on which of the five CSP areas was
being modeled. Some were significant, while others were not. These results demonstrate that
researchers should not combine all types of CSP into a single measure. Future research questions
should be more precise in terms of defining which area or areas of CSP are being investigated. In
addition, future researchers could explore other factors that might stimulate positive CSP
programs and initiatives or lead to reductions in CSP concerns. Finally, one of the weaknesses of
our study is an inconsistency in the unit of analysis – macro economic influences vs. firm-level
decisions that influence CSP. To overcome this weakness, future research could examine firm
executive perceptions of economic health as the independent variable rather than changes in
GDP.
From a practical perspective, the evidence found in this paper is relevant in at least two
ways. First, it confirms that corporations have a tendency to neglect some areas associated with
CSP negatives during recessions, and it is noticed. That is, KLD researchers observed the
concerns as they collected the data. As we noted in the methods section, the majority of large
institutional financial managers use KLD’s data, and CSP concerns can influence both firm
reputation and investment decisions (Waddock and Graves, 1997). Consequently, this study
suggests that corporate managers should exercise caution and restraint when making decisions
that could negatively influence CSP during tough economic times. Second, the rather surprising
findings that firms tend to engage in positive CSP-related actions and programs during periods of
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slow economic growth suggests that they may be using these tools strategically in an effort to
enhance their reputations in an attempt to counteract difficult economic conditions. Although this
study utilizes a large sample over several years, this is to our knowledge the first time such an
effect has been documented in the empirical research literature. Consequently, we make this
observation with reservations, suggesting that further research is necessary on this topic before
we can draw this conclusion with confidence.
In conclusion, this study offers evidence that changes in economic growth have a
significant influence on firm CSP. Furthermore, the nature of the influence depends on the CSP
area under investigation and on whether we are discussing positive CSP actions and programs or
neglect of particular CSP areas of concern. We also find that positive CSP initiatives are
associated with reduced profits in the next year regardless of economic conditions, but a
reduction in CSP concerns is positively related to profits only in high growth economies. We
hope these findings stimulate more precise empirical work and theoretical development on the
topic of corporate social responsibility and inclusion of changes in economic growth in future
empirical models.
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Table 1. Examples of KLD Ratings and Corresponding Evidence

Company

Rating

Evidence

Information Source

Cytokinetics, Inc.

Employee
Concern

Reducing workforce by 29%

RTT News (2008)

Sealed Air Corp.

Product
Concern

Paid $25 million to victims of a Providence Journal (2008)
night club incident in which
their foam insulation caught
fire

Amazon.com, Inc.

Employee
Strength

Whole Foods
Market, Inc.

Product
Strength

USG Corp.

Diversity
Strength

UAL Corp.

Diversity
Concern

Pall Corp.

Community
Concern

Tiffany and Co.

Community
Strength

American
Superconductor
Corp.

Environmental
Strength

Patriot Coal Corp.

Environmental
Concern

Granted large stock awards

Ranked #1 for product quality
by peer group

10-K (2008)

Fortune (2008)

Numerous anti-discrimination Justia–Dockets and Filings (2009)
legal suits filed
Benefits that address work-life Company website (2008)
balance, including flexible
work schedule, mother’s room,
childcare, employee assistance
Understated income tax
Business Wire (2008)
payments and provision for
taxes relating to intercompany
balance
Contributed $10 million to
charitable foundation

10-K (2008)

Direct investment in clean
energy market

Written testimony for the Senate
Committee on Environment and
Public Works (2009)

Paid $6.5 million civil penalty U.S. Environmental Protection
for discharge permit violations Agency website (2009)
associated with the federal
Clean Water Act
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics and Pearson Correlations
Variable

Mean

S.D.

1.

1. ∆ GDP Per Capita

0.013 0.006

-

2. Total Strengths

-0.178 2.674

.127

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

-

3. Total Concerns

-0.356 2.008

-.001

.187

-

4. Comm. Strengths

0.086 0.346

.146

.688

.217

-

5. Diversity Strengths

0.626 0.935

.113

.762

.177

.530

-

6. Employee Strengths

0.201 0.433

.159

.669

.056

.296

.420

-

7. Environ. Strengths

0.071 0.273

.069

.657

.197

.398

.367

.290

8. Product Strengths

0.049 0.202

.099

.575

.027

.212

.212

.257 .303

9. Comm. Concerns

0.035 0.166

-.016

.193

.532

.147

.191

.129

10. Diversity Concerns 0.404 0.449

-.205 -.233

-

.206

.015

.457 -.110 -.270 -.173 -.128 -.105

.034

.075

11. Employee Concerns 0.498 0.579

-.047

.030

.557

.023

.067 -.028 -.002

.004

.057

12. Environ. Concerns

0.071 0.334

.120

.247

.527

.168

.214

.129

.407

.078

.365 -.036

.117

13. Product Concerns

0.176 0.476

.072

.363

.635

.396

.372

.153

.230

.088

.316 -.005

.106 .309

14. Cash//Assets

0.170 0.136

-.074 -.085 -.137 -.115 -.060 -.068 -.082 -.035 -.100

15. Debt/Assets

0.451 0.281

.041

16. Current Ratio

2.973 2.150

-.034 -.141 -.115 -.143 -.167 -.076 -.104 -.048 -.106

17. ROA

0.008 0.164

.059

.098

.010

.107

.092

.055

.058

18. Size

6.406 1.683

.176

.455

.345

.401

.441

.317

.301

.081

.157

.094

.094

.021

.084

.020

-

.051 -.072 -.158 -.142

.091 -.060

.156 .120

-

.144 -.259

-

.118

-.102 -.123 -.146

.413 -.480

.033

.052 -.036

-.106 .060 .119

-.121 -.339 -.019

.178

.289 -.180

.138 .330 .468 -.462

19. R&D Intensity

0.137 0.476

.055 -.040 -.026 -.038 -.048 -.009 -.042 -.024 -.036

20. Advert. Intensity

0.030 0.076

.062 -.003 -.007

.041

-

-

.279 -.461 .344

-

.002

.017 -.045 -.052

.235

.058 .254 -.395 -.309

.014 -.026 -.010 -.006 -.001 -.037

.015 -.013 .016

.078

.034 .065 -.189 -.105 .342

__________________________________________________________________________________________________

-

__________________

Note: These statistics are based on averages for 837 companies across all available years. Since this study uses an unbalanced panel design, the correlation coefficients are for
descriptive purposes only and do not represent a valid test of hypotheses. Nonetheless, for information purposes, correlation coefficients greater than .068 are significant at p<.05,
greater than .087 are significant at p<.01 and greater than .113 are significant at p<.001. The Total CSR variables are based on the sum of the standardized KLD variables across the
five areas, which accounts for their small negative mean and relatively larger standard deviation.
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Table 3. Effect of Real Gross Domestic Product Per Capita On CSP

CSP Dependent Variables
Total Strengths
Total Concerns
Independent Variable
Change in GDP Per Capita
Control Variables
Cash/Total Assets
Total Debt/Total Assets
Current Ratio
Return on Assets
Size
R&D Intensity
Advertising Intensity
Lagrange Multiplier Test
R-squared
N
Companies

-100.5837***

-29.1496***

1.5177***
-0.2740
0.0411
-0.5404**
1.4619***
0.3052***
0.2867

0.1887
0.6261***
0.0341
-0.3661*
0.5294***
0.1712*
-0.4690

11755.60***
0.2456
4463
837

8109.93***
0.1417
4463
837

Note: Models are two-way random designs with company identifiers as the
stratification variables and years as the period variables.
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
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Table 4. Effect of Real Gross Domestic Product Per Capita On Individual CSP Variables

COM
Independent Variable
Change in GDP PC
Control Variables
Cash/Tot Assets
Tot Debt/Tot Assets
Current Ratio
Return on Assets
Size
R&D Intensity
Adv Intensity

0.06
0.02***
0.00
0.07*
0.12***
0.06
0.01

R-squared
N
Companies

0.03
4463
837

0.91

Total CSP Stengths
DIV
EMP
ENV
-18.49***
0.55***
-0.03
-0.00
-0.20**
0.42***
0.07*
0.08
0.25
4463
837

-3.17

-10.59***

PRO

COM

Total CSP Concerns
DIV
EMP
ENV

PRO

-2.34*

-4.27***

0.34

-11.09***

-3.28**

-5.45***

-0.02
0.02
0.22***
0.01
0.00
0.01*
-0.13*
-0.02
0.06*** 0.09***
0.00
0.03**
-0.09
-0.01

0.11
0.07
0.00
-0.04
0.14***
0.05***
-0.03

0.08
-0.05
0.00
0.04
0.11***
0.00
0.10

0.10*
0.00
0.00*
-0.05
0.08***
0.26*
0.00

0.05
-0.03
0.00
-0.02
0.03***
0.01
0.05

0.02
0.02
0.00*
-0.02
0.04***
0.01
0.01

0.10
4463
837

0.11
4463
837

0.04
4463
837

0.09
4463
837

-0.06
0.04
-0.00
0.05
-0.05***
0.01
-0.14
0.01
4463
837

0.04
4463
837

0.11
4463
837

0.21
4463
837

Note: Models are two-way random designs with company identifiers as the stratification variables and years as the period
variables. Results of Lagrange Multiplier Tests were omitted so this table could fit on one page, which is helpful for
comparative purposes; however, they are all significant at p<.001. Abbreviations are as follows: COM=Community,
DIV=Diversity, EMP=Employee, ENV=Environment, PRO=Product
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
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Table 5. Test for Interaction Effects of Economic Growth on the Relationship
Between CSP and Firm Performance (ROA)

CSP Variable Used in Model (ROA is Dependent Variable)
Control Variables
Cash/Tot Assets
Total Debt/Tot Assets
Current Ratio
Size
R&D Intensity
Advertising Intensity
Independent Variable
CSP
Change in GDP
Per Capita
CSP X Change in
GDP Per Capita
Lagrange Multiplier
Test
R-squared
N
Companies

Total
Strengths

Total
Concerns

Total
Strengths

0.0452*
-0.2584***
0.0021
0.0425***
-0.0698***
-0.2384***

0.0402*
-0.2567***
0.0021
0.0405***
-0.0707***
-0.2390***

0.0465*
-0.2582***
0.0021
0.0430***
-0.0694***
-0.2387***

0.0438*
-0.2561***
-0.0020
0.0412***
-0.0700***
-0.2384***

-0.0026***

-0.0019

-0.0021**
0.5630

-0.0006
0.8854

-0.0420

-0.1146***

851.73***

828.94***

0.2700
3597
820

0.2702
3597
820

1336.80***

1303.71***

0.2623
3597
820

0.2626
3597
820

Total
Concerns

Note: Models are two-way random designs with company identifiers as the stratification
variables and years as the period variables.
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
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